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EXPERT TESTIMONY BY PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
In the field of expert witnesses, there is considerable confusion on
the qualifications one needs to possess in order that his testimony be
admissible. The reason for this is that the appellate courts have failed
to establish criteria by which the trial courts can be guided. The
purposes of this article are to discuss briefly the basis of the use of
expert witnesses and to discover the best criteria which ought to be
established as to physicians' qualifications to testify as experts on
matters of general medical opinion and in malpractice cases.
EXPERT WITNESSES IN GENERAL
The first consideration in a survey of expert witnesses is a general
definition of an "expert." That term designates one who possesses a
special skill or knowledge on a particular matter which is so superior
to the knowledge of men in general as to that particular matter that his
formation of a judgment'is a fact of probative value.' Experts have
also been described as men of science educated in the arts or individuals
who have acquired special or peculiar information from practical
experience.'
The function of an expert witness is best described in these words:
"The test to determine whether a witness is qualified as an
expert is to inquire whether his knowledge of the matter in
relation to which his opinion is asked is such that it will probably
aid the trier of the question to determine the truth."
'3
The jury or court is often confronted with issues that can be
properly understood only by those having specialized knowledge and
which cannot be accurately determined by deductions and inferences
drawn from the facts using ordinary knowledge and usual practical
experience. On such issues; testimony of one possessing special
knbwledge or skill is required to arrive at just and intelligent
conclusion.
As to what qualifications one must possess to be considered an
expert, there is great diversity of opinion.4 The courts have set no exact
requirement as to the mode in which this skill or experience must have
been acquired.5 To manifest the inconsistency in the attempted limita-
tion as to these requirements, the Wisconsin courts have held that
knowledge acquired solely through study will not qualify one as an
132 C. J. S. EVIDENCE §457.
2 Empire Oil and Refining Co. v. Hoyt, 112 F. 2d 356 (6th Cir. 1940). See
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 402 (1942).
3 Olgiati v. New England Box Co., 80 N.H. 399, 117 Atl. 735 (1922).
43 JONES, EVIDENCE § 1315 (2nd Ed.) ; 22 C. J. EVIDENCE §608.
5 20 Am. Jur, EVIDENCE §784.
COMMENTS
expert,0 while our sister state of Michigan states study alone is a suffi-
cient source.7 And New Jersey rules that one may be qualified to testify
as expert either by study without practice, or practice without study.8
Appellate courts of several states have seen this lack of a definite
criterion so clearly that they have remarked of it in their decisions.9
But while there is considerable question on the criteria necessary for
the qualification of expert testimony, the general and universally
accepted rule is expressly stated in two recent Wisconsin cases to be:
"The question of whether a witness possesses sufficient knowl-
edge to qualify as an expert is generally one for the trial court
and unless it appears that in its determination the trial court is
guilty of an abuse of discretion, his ruling will stand." 10
Nevertheless there is no universal rule as to the test which the trial
court should apply as to expert witnesses generally. So this article shall
confine itself to two major classes of experts. First the qualifications
required of physicians and surgeons to enable them to testify in
ordinary medical matters will be discussed.. Then the qualifications
necessary to enable physicians and surgeons to testify as expert
witnesses in malpractice cases will be explained.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS IN GENERAL AS EXPERTS
The main problem as to the qualification of a physician or surgeon
as an expert is whether the physician must have had a case concerning
the same or a similar problem. While the decisions as to this are not
harmonious, many early cases set down the rule that a physician is
competent to testify as an expert even though he has had no experience
in a similar case.
That is exemplified in Kelley v. United States" where a physician
was asked about elevation of a pistol necessary to inflict a certain
wound. His testimony was held competent by reason of his general
professional studies and experience though he had not made any special
study of nor had any experience with gunshot wounds.
In a North Carolina case,'12 the testimony of a physician that
drowning was the cause of death was held competent although he had
6 Luning v. State, 1 Chand. 264, 2 Pin. 284 (1849) ; Kath v. Wis. Cent. R. R. Co.
122 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217 (1904).
7 People v Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 66 N.W. 562 (1896) ; accord, Delaney et al.
v. Morris 193 Okl. 589, 145 P. 2d 936 (1944).
s Fenias v. Reichenstein, 124 N.J.L. 196, 11 A. 2d 10 (1940).
9 Kelley v. Richardson, 69 Mich. 430, 37 N.W. 54 (1888) ; Strutters v. Philadel-
phia & D.C. R. Co. 174 Pa. 291, 34 Atl. 443 (1896); Sioux City R. R. Co. v.
Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578, 20 N.W. 860 (1884).
10 Anderson v. Eggert, 234 Wis. 348, 291 N.W. 365 (1940) ; Morrill v. Komasin-
ski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W. 2d 620 (1949). See 166 A.L.R. 1067 and 32 C.J.S.
EVIDENCE §449, 458b.
11 Kelley v. United States, 27 Fed. 616 (1st Cir. 1885).
12 State v. Wilcox 132 N.C. 1120, 44 S.E. 625 (1903). Accord, State v. Megordin,
49 Ore. 259, 88 Pac. 306 (1907); People v. Phelan 123 Cal. 551, 56 Pac. 424(1899).
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never examined the body of one who had drowned and based his
opinion on authorities he had read.
In cases of poisoning, the general rule is that a physician who is a
graduate of a medical college and is engaged in general practice is
competent to testify as to the effect of a certain poison although in his
own practice he has not seen a person affected by that poison.13 This is
clearly illustrated in People v. Thacher,14 where the Michigan court
held that a graduate of a medical school who was practicing medicine
could testify in a case of poisoning, though he had never treated one
who had been poisoned nor seen such a person. That court ruled that
the jury should be allowed to consider such testimony and then give it
the weight it deserves in light of the other evidence presented.
In Wisconsin, the basic requirement for a physician to qualify as an
expert is stated in the statutes to be a license. 15
In addition to that, the Wisconsin court has held as a general rule
on expert testimony that one cannot testify to what he has learned
entirely from books and study.16 Following this basic rule, the Wis-
consin court in Soquet v. State'7 held that a physician whose knowledge
in respect to arsenic poisoning was derived, not from personal observa-
tion or experience, but wholly, from medical or scientific books or in-
struction is not competent to testify as an expert as to the symptoms of
such poisoning. This rule was referred to in a later Wisconsin case",
which held that in order that the rule be applied and testimony excluded
it must be affirmatively shown by the objecting party that the experts
had had no practical experience.
Here to show the strict application of this criterion in Wisconsin,
Zoldoske v. State'9 and Bowers v. State' ° are cited. In the first case, a
physician who had previously attended one case of strychnine poisoning
before his graduation from medical school was held competent to testify
as an expert in another such case. The other case held that a physician
who had had seventeen years of medical practice and had treated many
bruises and wounds of the head was competent to testify as a witness
"3 Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross-Lewin, 24 Colo. 43, 51 Pac. 488 (1897) ; Rice
v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 569, 112 S.W. 299 (1907) ; Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40,
39 S.E. 897 (1901).
14People v. Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 66 N.W. 562 (1896).
15 Wis. STAT. (1951), sec. 147.14 (2). "No person violating subsection (1) [per-
taining to the practice of medicine without a license] of this section shall have
the right to collect by law any compensation for professional services, or to
testify in a professional capacity as a medical or osteopathic physician or prac-
titioner of any form or system of treating the affected, or as an insanity ex-
pert; . .. " Infra, note 42.
16Supra, note 6.
' Soquet v. State 72 Wis. 659,40 N.W. 391 (1888).
18 Kath v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. 121 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217 (1904).
19 Zoldoski v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892).
20 Bowers v. State, 122 Wis. 163, 99 N.W. 447 (1904).
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concerning fractures of the skull, because it was not shown that he had
never treated a skull fracture.
It would seem that since all testimony is to be weighed by the jury
in their determination of the facts and that they are the ultimate judge
of its credibility and weight, all physicians who are licensed so as to
fulfill the statutory requirement ought to be allowed to testify as
experts. Then the extent of their practical experience and knowledge
would be considered by the jury in weighing the testimony. In 1923,
the Wisconsin court in Manna v. State2 1 stated, in answer to an ob-
jection as to the testimony of two physicians on the type and effect of a
gunshot wound on the ground that neither had had experience with
such a wound, that such experience was unnecessary to qualify those
men because of their other experience and knowledge of anatomy.
There are two practical considerations which support this new
Wisconsin trend and the majority rule. The first is the problem raised
in Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross Lewin.22 The court stated that in the
case of a newly discovered poison, expert testimony would be excluded
if a physician must have practical experience with the poison before he
is qualified to testify as an expert.
The other is the reluctance of members of the medical profession
to testify in court cases. While this is especially true in malpractice
cases,23 it is somewhat applicable in all cases. By setting the criteria for
qualification at possession of a medical license, more physicians would
be eligible to testify as experts as to general medical matters, and this
second problem would be overcome.
PHYSICIANS' TESTIMONY IN MALPRACTICE CASES
Malpractice is defined as:
". .. bad, wrong, or injudicious treatment of a patient, pro-
fessionally and in respect to the particular disease or injury,
resulting in injury, unnecessary suffering or death to the patient,
and proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of proper
professional skill, disregard of established rules or principles,
neglect or a malicious or criminal intent."24
The problem which is raised in a majority of malpractice cases is
what constitutes "ignorance, carelessness or want of proper professional
skill." 25 The criterion is not the highest skill medical science knows;
the law requires physicians to possess and use that reasonable degree of
skill, knowledge, and care usually possessed and exercised by other
21 Manna v. State, 179 Wis. 384, 192 N.W. 160 (1923).
22 Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross-Lewin, supra, note 12.2 3 Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 Pac. 200 (1918) ; Johnson v. Winston, 68
Neb. 425, 94 N.W. 607 (1903).
24 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (1933).
25 Supra, note 24.
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physicians under similar circumstances. 26 This standard has been
limited somewhat to general medical custom in the same vicinity 27 or
the same or similar communities. 28 The theory supporting this is that a
physician in a small or rural community who does not have the oppor-
tunity or ability to keep up to date with advances in his profession
should not be held to the same standard of care as physicians in large
communities who have that opportunity.
2 9
In Wisconsin, two additional factors have been added so that due
care is now defined as:
"that degree of care, diligence, judgment, and skill which physi-
cians in good standing in the same school of medicine usually
exercise in the same or similar localities under like or similar
circumstances, having regard to the advanced state of medical or
surgical science at the time he has discharged his legal duty to
his patient."2 0
The rule as to the same school of medicine is that a licensee of one
school of medicine cannot testify as to conduct of a person licensed in
another school of medicine.2 ' This was interpreted not to exclude the
testimony of members of another school as to a method of treatment on
which the theories of the schools do or should concur. 32 It has also been
construed as not placing a physician at his own peril when he must
choose one of two accepted methods of treatment based on theories of
opposing schools,32 and not excluding testimony of a physician of one
school who is sufficiently acquainted with the doctrines of the other
school when his testimony is based on the premises of the other school.34
The function of the other factor, due regard to the advanced state of
the medical profession at the time in question, is to forbid physicians in
small communities to hide behind their culpable ignorance though it
26 41 Am. JuP. PHYSICIAN & SURGEONS §82.
27 Trindle v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. 2d 330, 143 2d (1943) ; Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind.
308, 15 N.E. 2d 365 (1938).
2SThomason v. Hethcock, 7 Cal. App.2d 634, 46 P. 2d 832 (1935); Iterman v.
Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E. 2d 365 (1938). See 8 A.L.R. 2d 772.
29 Warnoch v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P. 2d 505 (1938).
30 Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888); Kuechler v. Volg-
mann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015 (1923); Kuehnemann v. Boyd, 193 Wis.
588, 215 N.W. 455 (1927).
31 Morrill v. Komasinski, supra, note 10.
32Treptau v. Behrens Spa Inc. 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W. 2d 108 (1945), where a
chiropracter in treating an injured foot with a diathermo-heat treatment was
held to have entered the general field of medicine and physicians were allowed
to testify as to due care which the chiropracter should have used because when
there is an invasion of the field of medicine the rule confining the inquiry as to
due care to the rules and principles of chiropractry or the particular school
of medicine to which he belongs does not exclude testimony of others on a
point in relation to which the principles of the schools do or should concur.
33 De Bruine v. Voskuil, 168 Wis. 104, 169 N.W. 288 (1918) ; Holton v. Burton,
197 Wis. 405, 222 N.W. 225 (1928).
34 Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918).
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does not place the same burden of skill on them as on those in larger
communities.
Courts in the United States have generally held that expert testi-
mony by witnesses qualified by knowledge and experience to define due
care under particular facts and circumstances is pre-eminently necessary
in malpractice cases.3 5 The reason for this is the same as the basis of
all expert testimony, that ordinary knowledge is not a sufficient foun-
dation upon which the jury can establish its determinations.
But while the above considerations are accepted, the criteria for the
qualification of expert witnesses in malpractice cases are in conflict as
evidenced by two recent cases. In a 1952 California, District Court of
Appeal decision,36 the criterion by which the trial court was to be
guided was stated to rest primarily on occupational experience which
has been described as:
"a practical knowledge of what is usually and customarily done
by physicians under circumstances similar to those which con-
fronted the defendant charged with the malpractice ... is of
controlling importance in determining competency of the expert
to testify to the degree of care against which the treatment
given is to be measured."37
The reason for this criterion is that the essential factor in qualifica-
tion is knowledge of the standard appropriate to circumstances of the
particular case, the essential factor being a similarity of conditions.3 8
The application of that factor was exemplified in Bickford v. Lawson,39
where a physician's testimony as to the necessity of using x-ray pictures
and use of the tension method in case of a fractured limb was properly
excluded because it was based on his own judgment and not on the
customary practice of physicians in Willows or similar communities, of
which the witness testified he had no knowledge. However, this appli-
cation is not a purely geographical one as pointed out by Lewis v.
Johnson,40 where a physician was considered qualified to testify as to
standard of care in Long Beach when he came from Los Angeles
because these were similar metropolises, and are located in the same
county. This is not limited to California but is also followed in New
Hampshire4 ' and Iowa.42
357 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2090 (a) (3rd ed. 1940) ; Hall vfl Plume, 131 N.J.L, 511,
37 A. 2d 3 (1949) ; McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912);
Kuehnemann v. Boyd, supra, note 30. See Note, 21 Miss. L. J. 291 (1950).
36 Pierce v. Linde, 248 P. 2d 506 (Cal. 1952).
37Huffmann v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P. 2d 34 (1951).38 Note, 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 138 (1950).
39 Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal. App. 2d 416, 81 P. 2d 216 (1938).
40 Lewis v. Johnson, 12 Cal. 2d 558, 86 P. 2d 99 (1939).
4' Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A. 2d 361 (1941). In that case the testi-
mony of a physician as to due care in Rochester was properly excluded since
the expert practiced in Boston notwithstanding the fact that he lived in Revere,
Mass. which is similar in size and resources to Rochester.
42Kerchner v. Dorsey and Dorsey, 226 Iowa 283, 284 N.W. 171 (1939).
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But in a New Jersey decision,43 it was held that the trial court erred
in excluding the testimony of an eighty-two year old specialist in gyne-
cology who was licensed in New York but had performed no operations
for twenty years and had witnessed ten to fifteen operations per year
for those twenty years except the last year and had kept up with medical
progress by reading. While following the same general rule as do the
California courts,44 that court insists on a liberal construction in stating:
"A trial court should have regard for the proof difficulties
adverted to and to the fundamental concept that where a right
exists the law would be deficient if there were no remedy for
violation of that right, and consequently should exercise his
discretion liberally toward the acceptance of the qualifications."
They conclude that if in addition to the license there is some
reasonable evidence of qualification, the expert should be allowed to
testify, and the jury should weigh the testimony in the light of his
experience.
The weakness of this liberal construction in malpractice cases is
discussed by Justice Waesche in his dissenting opinion.45 He points out
that the basis of due care testimony is knowledge of what other physi-
cians in the same or similar circumstances in the same or similar
community would do. Since the expert had not practiced for twenty
years, had had no hospital experience for that period of time, and since
there was no indication of any such experience since his early training
in this type of case, the witness was held by the trial judge and by the
dissenting judge not to qualify as an expert.
In malpractice cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in an early
case, 46 held it was not error to allow physicians, who lived thirty miles
from the place of treatment, to testify as experts when they qualified
themselves as being familiar with the practice of medicine and customs
of their profession in the place of treatment. That appears to be the
only decision in which Wisconsin took a stand on this question, al-
though they have often stated the general riles applicable. 47
But in order to give a complete picture of the Wisconsin law, a
recent decision there should be considered. 4 In that case, an osteopath
licensed in Michigan but not in Wisconsin was allowed to testify as to
the due care which a Wisconsin physician ought to exercise in the
diagnosis and treatment of a bone fracture where the witness testified he
knew of the usual practice of surgery in similar communities in Mich-
igan and the plaintiff was unable to obtain medical witnesses in her
4 Carbone v. Warburton, 91A. 2d 518 (N.J. 1952).
44 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra, note 31.
45 Supra, note 39.
46 Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924 (1902).
47 CONRAD, WIscONSIN EVIDENCE §4446, 4447.
48 Morrill v. Komasinski, supra, note 10.
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behalf. Our statute authorizes the admission of the expert testimony of
a physician from another state when one of the parties is unable to
secure testimony from physicians of this state or the physician was in
actual consultation in the case.49 The admission of this testimony did
not violate the rule that testimony of a physician from one school is
inadmissible against a physician of another school,50 because the court
considered that surgery was a common field on which both could testify
because there was a close similarity in their educational background and
experience and both schools are licensed to perform surgery.-"
OPINION OF A PHYSICIAN NOT A SPECIALIST
The basic rule on the use of testimony by a physician who is not a
specialist in the particular field about which he testifies is that a
physician or a surgeon, regardless of his practice and experience, is an
expert and his opinion on questions concerning his profession and
practice is admissible in evidence. But if he has specialized, his opinion
may be of more value than that of one who has not.52 This is in accord
with the great weight of authority up to the present time.53
Wigmore on this question of comparing the testimony of general
practitioners and specialists states:
"Here the Courts seem not to have taken a sufficiently firm
stand against the narrow objections frequently raised. It is not
that the rulings themselves are illiberal, but that narrow doctrines
are not repudiated with sufficient positiveness. The liberal
doctrine should be insisted on that the law does not require the
best possible kind of a witness, but only persons of such qualifi-
cations as the community daily and reasonably relies upon in
seeking medical advice. Specialists are in most communities
few and far between; the ordinary medical practitioner should
be received on all matters as to which a regular medical training
necessarily involves some knowledge." 54
The real problem consists of the weight which ought to be given a
specialist's testimony in comparison with that of a general practitioner.
The cases state that the testimony of a specialist may be given more
weight than that of a general physician but no definite standard has
4 Wis. STAT. (1951), sec. 147.14 (2) .... and that practitioners in medicine,
surgery or osteopathy licensed in other states may testify as experts in this
state when such testimony is necessary to establish the rights of citizens or
residents of this state in a judicial proceeding and expert testimony of licensed
practitioners of this state sufficient for the purpose is not available." Wis.
STAT. (1951), sec. 147.19 (1) ; Landrath v. Allstate Inc. Co. 259 Wis. 248, 48
N.W. 2d 485 (1950).5o Supra, note 34 and 43.
51Supra, note 31.
5 2 LAwSON, THE LAw oF EXPERT AND OPINIoN AND EVIDENCE 136 (2nd Ed. 1900).
5 Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, supra, note 13; supra, note 39. See Notes, 54
A.L.R. 861, 14 ANN. CAS. 137,20 A,,i. JuR. EVIDEN E §865.
54 2 WIGMORE, EvrDENcE §569 (3rd Ed. 1940).
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been established.5 5 Wigmore believes that there are no rules in our
system of evidence stating the precise effect or weight any general or
special class of evidence ought to be given by the jury.' 6 In his revision
of Branson's Instruction to Juries, Justice Reid states this as the rule:
"Expert testimony, when admissible at all, must go to the jury
like any other testimony in the case without discrimination by the
court as to its weight." 57
This does not mean that no instructions can be given, but that such
instructions must not invade the jury's right to make a final deter-
mination.
Among the approved instructions which are cited in that work, there
are none which attempt to answer the problem specifically. In the most
specific example5" the court instructed that the medical experts, because
of their training, knowledge, and experience in the medical and surgical
professions, are permitted to express opinions which the ordinary lay
witness is not allowed to do. This testimony should be used insofar as
it aids the jury's deliberations. The testimony of these expert witnesses
should be given such weight as their skill, training, knowledge, and
veracity entitle them to receive.
That instruction could be applied to the testimony of a specialist.
The jury could then decide whether the particular additional knowledge
and experience the witness has had makes his opinions more valuable
just as they do in a case involving a witness with one year's experience
as a hand writing expert and a witness with thirty years of similar
experience. The instruction merely points out that greater degrees of
experience or specialization may be considered by the jury.
CONCLUSION
The establishment of a definite criterion to guide trial courts in
admitting or excluding the testimony of physicians and surgeons as
expert witnesses would be a great aid to the trial courts and would also
reduce the burden of appellate courts in appeals on this question.
As to testimony of physicians on general matters, the Wisconsin rule
in demanding practical experience on the particular subject matter is too
strict. The better policy would be to allow. all physicians who are
licensed to testify on these matters. Then as in the case of specialists,
the jury can weigh the testimony taking into consideration the experi-
ence and practice of these witnesses and its effect on their opinions.
Practical experience on these general matters is not vital to the issue
and is often largely irrelevant.
55 Supro, note 52.
56 1 WIGMORE, EvENcE §26 (3rd Ed. 1940).
57 1 BRANSON, INSTRUCTIONs TO JURIEs §35 (3rd Ed., Reid, 1936).
584 BRANSON, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURES §2587 (3rd Ed., Reid, 1936). Misrach v.
Epperson, 32 Ohio App. 451, 168 N.E. 230 (1929).
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In malpractice cases, a stricter policy should be followed. Practical
experience in the exact field of testimony is necessary in those cases
because due care is based on the particular circumstances and the
practice in the same or similar communities. The function of an expert
witness in a malpractice case is to testify as to due care. Without
practical knowledge of what is usually done in a particular case, a
physician will do nothing more than confuse the issues before the jury
and cloud their minds with unnecessary medical opinion not applicable
to the particular case.
DONALD GRIF.IN, JR.
